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Presence and Absence in Lochner:
Making Rights Real
By EILEEN A. SCALLEN*
Judicial rhetoric is one of the most complex types of public argu-
ment in the United States. No one questions the right of the executive
and legislative branches to engage in political, deliberative argumenta-
tion. However, the judicial branch, specifically the United States
Supreme Court, continually engages in a dance between a desire for
stability and a perceived need for change, between what the law "is"
and what the law "ought to be." In classical rhetoric terms, the Court
attempts to maintain its appearance as the consumer of forensic rheto-
ric while engaging in deliberative rhetoric.
I have argued elsewhere that the focus on the Court's actual adju-
dicative process is futile, and a more useful focus is on the sufficiency
of the Court's argumentation in justifying its decision.' This is espe-
cially true in modem constitutional discourse since the Court has
moved from stating bright-line tests toward a discourse of balancing
governmental and individual rights.2 Others have attempted to quan-
tify the balancing process, using algebraic formulas3 or economic mod-
els.4 Yet at bottom, the Court's decision to balance governmental
justifications against individual liberty interests in deciding constitu-
tionality is the selection of an argumentative strategy.
However, the balancing strategy, itself a metaphor, causes rhetor-
ical problems for the Court. How does one "measure" various rights
or interests and "weigh" them against each other? Or, as Justice
Scalia has asked, how does one compare the length of a line to the
weight of a rock?5 This Essay uses the majority opinion in Lochner v.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. See Eileen A. Scallen, Judgment, Justification and Junctions in Rhetorical Criticism
of Legal Texts, 60 S. COMM. J. 68 (1994).
2. See generally David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45
HASnNGs L.J. 753 (1994).
3. Id. at 765.
4. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
5. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
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New York,6 one of the Court's most infamous attempts to balance the
will of the majority against individual liberty interests, to illustrate the
problems resulting from the Court's decision to balance rights and
governmental interests.
The central issue in Lochner was the constitutionality of a New
York law limiting the number of hours a baker could work to sixty per
week or ten per day.7 The majority held the law unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it unreasonably interfered
with the liberty to contract between employer and employee. 8 Loch-
ner is a landmark Supreme Court case for two central reasons. First,
Lochner demonstrated the Court's acceptance of economic substan-
tive due process, the notion that economic legislation that unreasona-
bly infringes individual liberty is unconstitutional. Economic
substantive due process requires that legislation have a reasonable re-
lation to a legitimate governmental interest.9 Second, the opinions in
Lochner represented different views of the Court's role vis-A-vis the
legislature. Justice Peckham's majority opinion expressed the willing-
ness of the Court to second-guess a legislative decision in order to
protect freedom of commerce. 10 In his famous dissent, Justice Holmes
argued for judicial restraint, as illustrated by his stinging aphorism,
"[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics."" Also dissenting, Justice Harlan, whose opinion more accu-
rately reflects the current law on economic substantive due process,
criticized the majority's eagerness to substitute its judgment for that of
the legislature. 2 Today, to say that the Court has engaged in
"Lochnerizing," is another way of accusing the Court of engaging in
judicial activism.
When balancing rights, the Court must attempt to make the inter-
ests come alive. The prevailing side's interest must appear stronger or
weightier than that of the competition. Justice Peckham attempted to
develop the relative weight of the competing interests by orchestrating
their "presence" through the use of repetitive structure, dominating
metaphor clusters, and "slippery slope" arguments resting on parallel-
6. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
7. Id at 53.
8. Id. at 53-54.
9. JoHN E. NowAK, CONSTIMTUTONAL LAW 398-401 (1978). The modem Supreme
Court has taken a very different approach to substantive due process objections to legisla-
tion that affects civil rights or individual liberties. The Court shows far less deference to
the legislature in these noneconomic areas. Id.
10. 198 U.S. at 52-65.
11. Id at 75.
12. Id at 72-73.
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ism, anaphora, and alliteration for their force.13 However, the Loch-
ner majority opinion provides a perfect illustration of the downside of
balancing: the temptation to make the scales tip too easily.
The structure of Justice Peckham's opinion resembles a top-forty
pop song with a few verses and a refrain. The refrain was his repeated
assertion that there is no basis for finding that this is a law intended to
protect the public health or the health of individual bakers. As in a
top-forty pop song, this repetition becomes numbing.
The first verse dealt with an issue of statutory interpretation. Jus-
tice Peckham argued that the statute necessarily implicated the consti-
tutional right to liberty of contract by limiting the number of hours an
employee could choose to work. 4 By selecting this starting point, Jus-
tice Peckham shifted the focus of the balancing and compared the
state's interest in health and safety with the employee's right to work,
a far more appealing image than the employer's right to contract. He
painted the hardship created by the statute:
The employee may desire to earn the extra money which would
arise from his working more than the prescribed time, but this
statute forbids the employer from permitting the employee to
earn it.'5
The next verse attempted to demonstrate Justice Peckham's rea-
sonableness by acknowledging that, in exercising its police powers, the
state has some limited right to regulate "the safety, health, morals,
and general welfare of the public."'1 6 However, he did not discuss the
possibilities for defining the scope of the "police powers" and the de-
gree to which the statute promoted those governmental interests. In-
stead, in the next few lines, Justice Peckham structured the remainder
of the opinion as a clash of diametrically opposed interests. He stated:
[I]t becomes of great importance to determine which shall pre-
vail-the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may
choose, or the right of the State to prevent the individual from
laboring or from entering into any contract to labor, beyond a
certain time prescribed by the State.1 7
In subsequent verses he repeats this antithesis:
Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and
arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his per-
13. See generally CHAIM PERELmAN & LUCiE OLBRECHTS-TYTEcA, THE NEw RHETO-
Ric: A TREATiSE ON ARGUMENTATION (John Wilkinson & Purcell Weaver, trans. 1969).
14. 198 U.S. at 53.
15. Id. at 52-53.
16. IcL at 53.
17. 1d at 54.
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sonal liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor
which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the support
of himself and his family? 8
With this rhetorical question, Justice Peckham solidified the
structure of his argument. The verses roll on:
It is a question of which of two powers or rights shall prevail-
the power of the State to legislate or the right of the individual
to liberty of person and freedom of contract. 9
To support this structure, Justice Peckham used a dominant clus-
ter of metaphors. He cast the state as an arbitrary parent, cruel to the
point where it would "cripple" its child, the laborer, in his effort "to
support himself and his family. ' 20 Justice Peckham writes sarcastically
of the legislature's exercise of its "paternal wisdom" 21 and its desire to
"assume the position of a supervisor, or pater familias, over every act
of the individual. '22 After creating it, Justice Peckham disparaged this
image:
There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occu-
pations, or that they are not able to assert their rights and care
for themselves without the protecting arm of the State, interfer-
ing with their independence of judgnent and of action. They
are in no sense wards of the state.
Through his use of structure and style, Justice Peckham framed
this case not under the image of the scales of justice where gradations
are possible, but as a see-saw with a bullying adult on one end and a
child on the other.
Justice Peckham's other key strategy was "slippery slope" argu-
mentation. Several times in the opinion, he used a parade of horribles
to accentuate the harm that would result from allowing the state to
legislate restrictions on a laborer's hours and work environment:
It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any department, may
possibly carry with it the seeds of unhealthiness. But are we all,
on that account, at the mercy of legislative majorities? A
printer, a tinsmith, a locksmith, a carpenter, a cabinetmaker, a
dry goods clerk, a bank's, a lawyer's or a physician's clerk, or a
clerk in almost any kind of business, would all come under the
power of the legislature, on this assumption. No trade, no occu-
18. Id at 56.
19. Id at 57.
20. Id at 59.
21. Id at 60.
22. It at 62.
23. Id at 57.
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pation, no mode of earning one's living, could escape this all-
pervading power 2 4
The rhythm of this cascade carries one down a slippery slope and
erodes any restraining force the state's interest might have had. But,
as with his use of imagery, Justice Peckham cannot seem to stop mid-
way. He later repeats this argument ad terrorem, combining its
rhythm with the power of alliteration:
Not only the hours of employ[ee]s, but the hours of employers,
could be regulated, and doctors, lawyers, scientists, all profes-
sional men, as well as athletes and artisans, could be forbidden
to fatigue their brains and bodies by prolonged hours of exer-
cise, lest the fighting strength of the State be impaired.' 5
Justice Peckham thus chose to portray the decision as an either/or
proposition: the state can run wild, or the individual's liberty can be
respected.
The problem here is that the test of substantive due process in-
vited a more complex discourse, one that acknowledged the subtleties
involved in defining state police powers and individual liberty inter-
ests. Justice Peckham made the presence of the governmental interest
and the liberty right vivid, but in an exaggerated way. He went over
the top, leaving the reader with the feeling that something, possibly
the middle ground or an appreciation of the complexity of the prob-
lem, was absent. Although Justice Peckham's opinion carried the day,
the Court eventually abandoned his approach and adopted a more
deferential approach to the legislature in reviewing economic legisla-
tion. This approach was represented in Lochner by Justice Harlan's
dissent.26
The problems with Justice Peckham's legal rhetoric are not con-
fined to judicial rhetoricians of his time or his particular political or
economic philosophy. The current Court is smitten with the image of
the scales of justice. One commentator has criticized the Court's bal-
ancing approach by suggesting the Court is comparing apples and or-
anges. 27 Another commentator has argued that the entire structure of
rights-based discourse needs to be replaced because of its potential
polarizing effect.' This may be the best route to stronger constitu-
tional adjudication and justification, but the law evolves slowly and
24. Id at 59.
25. Id at 60.
26. NowAx, supra note 9.
27. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law and the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 972 (1987).
28. See generally M.A. GLE-NDON, RiGHTs TALT: T'- IMPOVERISHMENT OF Pour-
lc~A DiscOuRsE (1991).
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has never been easily amenable to reconceptualization. In the
meantime, the balancing strategy could be improved if the Court were
to create weighty images for the position that it supports without giv-
ing in to the temptation of making the outcome appear inevitable.
The Court must balance in a way that helps us feel the presence of the
rights involved, but that does not leave us with a feeling of emptiness,
a feeling that something is being suppressed or ignored. How well the
Court or a particular Justice does this is the material for critics of ar-
gument in the future.
